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Abstract 
There are abundant literatures on linkages between migration, remittances and development, 
between gender and migration, and between gender and development. The missing link in this 
set of overlapping literatures is gender and remittances. Thus far, some studies have tried to 
determine whether female migrants are ‘better’ remitters than men: results are mixed. But this 
is not the right question. It is more important to explore how gender relations shape the 
sending, receipt and utilisation of remittances; and how, in turn, the remittance process 
reshapes gender relations. This paper takes the case of recent Albanian migration to 
neighbouring Greece – one of post-communist Europe’s largest cross-border migrations – to 
illustrate how the patriarchal nature of the sending society, Albania, fundamentally shapes 
both the gendered pattern of migration and its equally gendered corollary, remittances. Based 
on questionnaire survey (n=350) and in-depth interview (n=45) data from fieldwork in rural 
south-east Albania and the Greek city of Thessaloniki, it is shown that the male-structured 
process of migration hardly allows women to remit, even when they are earning in Greece. 
Typologies of household-to-household remittances are developed. Interview data reveals that 
migration to Greece, and its attendant remittance flows, does give, within limits, increased 
agency to women within both the migrant and residual households, but things are on the whole 
slow to change. 
 
 
Introduction 
Within the fast-growing literature on 
migration and development – or, as it is 
increasingly known, the migration–
development nexus (Van Hear and Nyberg 
Sørensen 2003) – the topic of gendering 
remittances has been curiously overlooked. 
This is surprising given both that 
remittances stand at the heart of the 
migration–development nexus, and that 
migration and development have been 
increasingly subject to gendered analyses. 
The importance of a gendered interpretation 
of remittances is enhanced by the growing 
scale of international migration. Latest data 
from the United Nations Population Division 
tell us that 214 million people worldwide are 
international migrants, living in a country 
different from that of their birth. A 
substantial proportion have moved as 
‘economic migrants’ seeking to improve 
their lives in a material sense. There is, both 
in the academy and amongst planners and 
policy makers, a growing consensus that 
migration, rather than being a symptom of 
underdevelopment or the outcome of failed 
development, is seen as a strategy of 
development and a route out of poverty. 
Remittances are seen as a key component, 
indeed the key element, of the positive 
relationship between migration and the 
development of migrant source countries. 
Yet the major focus of remittance research 
is on their measurement and utilisation from 
a financial and economic perspective. True, 
recent attention given to the social 
dimension of remittances has broadened 
the focus somewhat. But Levitt’s (1998) 
pioneering concept of ‘social remittances’, 
the norms and behaviours conveyed by 
migrants back to their home communities, 
has been little followed through, and stops 
short of a thorough analysis of changing 
gender ideologies. 
Another relevant theoretical focus for 
examining remittances from a gendered 
perspective is the ‘gendered geographies of 
power’ framework introduced by Mahler and 
Pessar (2001) to analyse how gender 
relations are expressed and negotiated 
across transnational spaces. In a 
subsequent paper these authors specifically 
point to remittances as an under-researched 
example of this ‘gendered power geometry’. 
Pessar and Mahler (2003: 817) urge that 
studies of remittances move beyond 
charting the financial magnitude and 
direction of these flows, and focus instead 
on the gendered social relations negotiated 
between senders and receivers. They pose 
three questions: 
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 Who sends remittances, and what 
stipulations are put on their use? 
 Who receives remittances, and what 
power do they have, if any, over the 
amount and frequency of remittances, 
and over their use? 
 What effect does the ‘economic’ 
transaction of remittance sending have 
on gender relations and on gendered 
divisions of labour within the 
family/household and the community? 
This question has the potential to be 
answered in two places: in the migrant-
sending, remittance-receiving context, 
and within the migrant-receiving, 
remittance-sending location too.  
This paper is an attempt to answer these 
questions in the specific geographic context 
of Albania and its recent mass migration to 
Greece, the neighbouring country to the 
south. The Albanian migration to Greece has 
been the most dramatic and intense of the 
East-West migrations triggered by the 
collapse of the communist regimes east of 
the old Iron Curtain. Against a resident 
population of a little over 3 million recorded 
in the 1989 and 2001 Albanian censuses, 
more than 1 million Albanians were living 
abroad as emigrants by 2005, 600,000 of 
them in Greece where they, in turn, made up 
around 60 percent of the country’s 1 million 
immigrants.  
The paper presents results drawn from 
research commissioned and financed by UN-
INSTRAW (United Nations International 
Research and Training Institute for the 
Advancement of Women) and UNDP (United 
Nations Development Programme).1 Our 
Albanian research was part of a six-country 
comparative project which also involved 
parallel studies in the Dominican Republic, 
Lesotho, Morocco, the Philippines and 
Senegal. In order to maximise the 
comparative nature of the overall project, 
some common research methods and 
                                                 
1 The title of the project was ‘Gender and Remittances: 
Building Gender-Responsive Local Development’. Thanks to 
UN-INSTRAW for inviting us to tender for, and awarding us, 
the Albanian study, which took place over the period 
October 2007 to June 2009. For our final report to 
INSTRAW see Vullnetari and King (2009).  
instruments were designed. We utilise two of 
these in this paper: a questionnaire survey 
of 350 remittance-receivers in a group of 
villages in south-eastern Albania; and 45 in-
depth interviews, 25 with remittance-
receivers in the villages, and 20 with 
remittance-senders in the Greek city of 
Thessaloniki, the main cross-border 
destination for migrants from this part of 
Albania. We regard the route between the 
villages and Thessaloniki, which passes 
through high mountains, as a migration and 
remittance corridor which channels the 
migrants, their remittances (financial, in-
kind, social) and other trans-border contacts 
in a continuous circuit of localised 
transnational activity. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The 
next three sections provide background 
information and perspectives. First, we look 
at the extant literature on gender and 
remittances within the frame of the 
migration–development nexus. Then we set 
the Albanian context by briefly reviewing the 
scale and pattern of migration and 
remittances, and saying something about 
patriarchy and gender relations in Albania. 
The third background section discusses our 
research methodology. The paper then shifts 
to explore Albanian remittances through the 
lens of gender. We develop a typology of 
Albanian remittance-sending and 
remittance-receiving households, and note 
changes over time. We then set remittances 
alongside transnational care and family 
cohesion. Using our survey data we next 
map out various channels of remittance 
transfer, and tabulate amounts and 
frequency of transfers by type of receiver. 
Using our interview data, we present 
gendered profiles of remitters and receivers. 
The penultimate section examines the use 
of remittances. The final main section 
reverses the analysis: instead of looking at 
how gender impacts on remittance 
behaviour, we look at the effects of 
remittances on gender relations. The 
conclusion reflects on how the three key 
questions outlined above have been 
answered by our Albanian data. 
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Migration, Remittances, Development, 
and Gender 
There are multiple interrelationships 
between these four headline words. Rather 
than try to review what have become vast 
quantities of literature2 we present a highly 
schematic overview in Figure 1. The solid 
lines indicate the pairings of 
concepts/processes on which a substantial 
literature already exists, and the arrows 
indicate the main directions of causality, 
which may be predominantly one-way or 
recursively balanced. Moving clockwise 
round the diagram, we note the following. 
First, there is a lot 
of evidence, mainly 
empirical, but with 
clear theoretical 
and policy 
implications, on 
the link between 
migration and 
remittances. Latest 
figures from the 
World Bank’s 
Migration and 
Remittances team 
estimate a global 
total of $328 
billion remitted to 
developing 
countries during 2008; their outlook for 
2009 is a 7 percent fall due to the global 
recession (Ratha and Mohapatra 2009). By 
and large, the relationship is one-way: 
migration produces remittances. However, a 
feedback loop is also possible, in that the 
beneficial or demonstrator effect of 
remittances may stimulate further migration. 
We should also acknowledge that ‘reverse 
remittances’ may flow from the migrant-
sending countries to support migrants, 
especially in their early stages of migration, 
or at times of crisis or hardship. 
Second, the positive causal link between 
remittances and development is clear 
enough with regard to direction but less 
                                                 
2 For accessible recent entries into the migration-
development literature see Castles and Delgado Wise 
(2008); de Haas (2010); Faist (2008); IOM (2005; 2008); 
Van Hear and Nyberg Sorensen (2003).  
clear with regard to outcome (Carling 2008). 
The ‘mantra’ of remittances as a driving 
force for development in poor countries 
(Kapur 2004) derives from micro- as well as 
macro-scale analytical positions. On the one 
hand it centres on a migrant-centred 
‘bottom-up’ interpretation of how 
development can be driven by remittances 
raining in, sprinkler fashion, at a local level. 
On the other it reflects a neoliberal 
positivism whereby remittances are part of a 
‘good-for-everyone’ scenario (Weinstein 
2002). Although we are no market 
triumphalists, we have written of migration’s 
‘triple-win’ outcome in the context of Albania 
and Kosovo/a, 
albeit from a 
theoretical and not 
an evidence-based 
standpoint. In this 
utopian view, 
migration benefits 
the receiving 
countries (through 
extra supplies of 
cheap and flexible 
labour), the 
migrants 
themselves (who 
escape from 
poverty and 
improve their, and 
their families’ livelihoods by migrating to 
higher-wage economies), and the sending 
countries, which receive inflows of foreign 
exchange to boost GDP, investment and 
development (King and Vullnetari 2009b: 
389-92). 
This merely scratches the surface of recent 
debates. Others adopt a more critical 
perspective (see, for instance, Glick Schiller 
and Faist 2009), drawing attention to the 
fact that, under certain circumstances, 
remittances may lead to a narrow and 
dangerous dependency, and can increase 
social and spatial inequalities because the 
migrants are not drawn from the poorest 
regions or from the ranks of the ‘poorest of 
the poor’.3 In these important debates on 
                                                 
3 For a brief review of remittances in the ‘New World Order’ 
see Jones (1998b) and Jones (1998a) for an empirical 
testing – with complex results – of the ‘equality or 
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remittances and (in)equality, the gender 
question is rarely raised.  
Gender is well-connected, in terms of 
existing scholarship, to both development 
and migration. And these two paired 
literatures – on gender and migration, and 
gender and development – are generally 
fully open to the two-way relationships 
involved. Thus, gender is one of the 
structuring parameters of migration, which is 
fundamentally conditioned by gender 
processes, roles and relations; and 
migration to a different society where gender 
relations are more open and egalitarian may 
reshape gender dynamics within the migrant 
household or community (or, conversely, 
make them more rigid as a strategy of 
resistance and ‘protection’ against the 
‘normally alien’ host society). 
So we see that all possible links in Figure 1 
are connected up by copious existing 
literatures – bar one, remittances and 
gender. In the next two subsections we 
briefly review what has been done; and what 
should be done. 
Are women better remitters than men? 
Most of the existing empirical studies on 
gender and remittances seem to have been 
set up to explicitly or implicitly answer this 
question. They take their lead from a series 
of mainly working or policy papers which 
proclaim that women are better remitters: 
they remit more, and are more regular and 
reliable remitters, it is repeatedly said. The 
interpretation of this usually includes 
reference to women’s caring and altruistic 
nature and the fact that they either feel, or 
perhaps have imposed on them, greater 
responsibilities for maintaining family 
linkages (Nyberg Sørensen 2005; Piper 
2005; Ramírez et al. 2005). The same set of 
presuppositions is used to claim that women 
are also better receivers of remittances, and 
use them more wisely for the good of the 
family as a whole. Nina Nyberg Sørensen 
(2005: 3) has set out this interpretation in 
the following terms: 
                                                                             
inequality’ question for Mexican migration and remittances. 
See also Adams and Page (2005) for a broader 
international comparison.  
Despite female migrants’ lower 
incomes, it is generally assumed that 
women by and large send back home a 
greater share of their earnings in 
remittances than men and also tend to 
be better savers. In addition to being the 
largest receivers of remittances, women 
– when in control of remittances – are 
believed to channel overseas financial 
transfers into better health, nutrition 
and education for the entire family, 
thereby supporting the development of 
stronger and more productive 
communities.  
From the relatively little research which has 
been done, both before and since Nyberg 
Sørensen’s plea, the results are 
extraordinarily mixed. For every study that 
demonstrates that women are ‘better’ 
remitters than men, another exists which 
gives the opposite result. We have reviewed 
much of this contradictory evidence in a 
separate paper currently under review 
(Vullnetari et al. 2010), so we will be 
deliberately selective here – whilst 
remaining true to the general picture.  
The case of Mexico and the Philippines are 
illuminating, for two reasons: first because 
these have two of the ‘greatest’ emigration 
(and therefore remittance-receiving) 
countries in the world over the past few 
decades; and secondly because the 
research evidence on remittances by sex is 
conflictual in both cases. In an early study of 
Mexican irregular migration to the United 
States Taylor (1987) found that men 
remitted more than women. Grassmuck and 
Pessar (1991), who observed similar 
patterns, concluded that men lived austere 
lives, saving and remitting as much as 
possible out of their income, as they 
considered their stay in the US temporary 
and were oriented towards return. Women, 
on the other hand, wanted to prolong their 
stay in the US and so tended to spend more 
there and remit home less. Much more 
recently Cohen (2010: 153) finds that male 
migrants from Oaxaca in southern Mexico 
who are living abroad send back twice as 
much on average as women migrants ($280 
per month as against $130). A similar 
contrast, albeit less marked and with much 
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lower sums, was noted by Cohen for 
remittances sent by internal male and 
female Oaxacan migrants living elsewhere in 
Mexico. These findings are challenged, 
however, by more qualitative research 
carried out by de la Cruz (1995) who argues, 
on the basis of a small number of family 
studies, that Mexican women remit more 
frequently and reliably than men. 
Similar apparent contradictions occur in the 
Filipino evidence. Tacoli’s (1999) research 
on Filipino migrants in Rome concluded that 
the women, who had mostly migrated on 
their own and worked as domestic cleaners 
and carers, had stronger remittance 
obligations to their families than their male 
counterparts. Young single women sent 
twice as much in remittances than single 
men; and married women with their children 
in the Philippines also sent more money, 
and more regularly, than their male 
equivalents. Yet, Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 
(2005) found that Filipino men remitted 
more than women. In contrast to Tacoli’s 
research, which was qualitative and host-
country-based, these authors surveyed a 
random sample of 1000 households in 
urban areas in the Philippines which had 
overseas workers. Their analysis showed 
that households with male emigrants were 
significantly better off than those with 
female emigrants, even after controlling for 
variables such as occupation, country of 
destination, age, marital status etc. 
And the story goes on – one of conflicting 
evidence and unclear conclusions. Three 
insights seem clear, even if they only serve 
to complicate the overall interpretation. 
First, the methodologies of the surveys 
differ, and this undoubtedly affects the 
results. Qualitative studies tend to support 
the view that women have a more caring 
and close relationship to their families in the 
home country and hence are ‘better’ 
remitters; whereas large quantitative 
surveys seem to record higher remittances 
from men. Why might this be? It could be 
that males are more ‘out in the open’ about 
their remittances which, perhaps, are more 
likely to be recorded and sent through 
formal channels. Women’s remittances are 
(again this is speculative) more likely to be 
in-kind, informal, even ‘secret’. Then there is 
the more statistical question of what kind of 
measurement is used: absolute remittances 
over the year, remittances as a share of 
income earned, or regularity of remittances. 
Each may give a different answer to the 
male–female comparison. 
The second observation we wish to make is 
that each study is set within its own 
situational context of time, place and group 
studied. A study based on Filipinos in Rome 
is not strictly comparable with one based in 
an area of the Philippines where most 
emigrant household members have gone to 
the Gulf and the Middle East. 
Thirdly, most of the studies reviewed under 
this heading have treated gender (read sex) 
as a neutral, dichotomous variable. As many 
studies of gender and migration have 
emphasised, gender is a relational concept: 
the migration behaviour of one sex is 
constructed very much as a function of its 
relationship to the other sex (Bjerén 1997). 
Put another way, gender organises 
migration; migration is engendered (Kofman 
2004; Mahler 1999; Pessar 1999). 
Our answer to the question as to whether 
women are better remitters than men is 
simply that this is not the right question. In 
the next subsection we set out an agenda 
for asking the right questions about gender 
and remittances.  
Remittances: a gender agenda 
The questions that should be asked firstly 
involve looking at the nature of gender-
power relations in migrant families, both at 
home and abroad; they should at the same 
time examine the overall patriarchal or 
matriarchal nature of the societies from 
which migrants are drawn, and into which 
they move; and they should then scrutinise 
access to decision-making power over 
whether and how remittances are sent – by 
whom, how much, how often, what for, and 
to whom. 
Some studies have already moved in these 
directions. At a discursive level Kunz (2008) 
has argued that the mainstreaming of 
remittances into international development 
policy is gender-blind. The promotion of 
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remittances is assumed by policy-makers 
and developmentalists to be somehow 
gender-neutral, but this is far from the case. 
Kunz takes us through the various initiatives 
promoted by key institutional actors such as 
the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), the World Bank, the European 
Commission and the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DfID), 
culminating in the United Nations’ High-
Level Dialogue on Migration and 
Development (2006) and the Global Forum 
on Migration and Development (2007). 
Throughout the discussions of these actors 
and forums, Kunz sees the ‘remittances are 
beautiful’ discourse as predominant. She 
detects no awareness of the gender-power 
relationships which are almost inevitably 
implicated in the on-the-ground enactment 
of migration, remittance and development 
processes. Neither is there much awareness 
of the human costs of migration for the 
migrants themselves and for their non-
migrant relatives and home societies; nor of 
the structural forces of global inequality that 
produce migration and remittances in the 
first place. 
Kunz (2008: 1399-1400) sees four 
approaches which can lay the groundwork 
for a gender analysis of remittances: 
studying different household typologies of 
remittances; broadening the 
conceptualisation of remittances to include 
social remittances; bringing a transnational 
perspective to bear on remittances, so that 
they are seen as a transnational activity 
embedded in transnational social and 
kinship relations, which are often highly 
gendered (Pessar and Mahler 2003); and 
carrying out ethnographies of remittances, 
which, following Marcus’ (1995) landmark 
statement, should be multi-sited. 
Our paper takes up these four analytical 
perspectives to explore the Albanian case. 
Before we do so, we briefly acknowledge 
some other studies which do take a more 
analytical and relational approach to how 
remittances are gendered.  
Rahman and Fee (2009) focus on 
Indonesian domestic workers in Malaysia, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, and their Javan 
households of origin. They find that female 
domestic-worker migrants remit a greater 
share of their earnings than Indonesian 
male migrants, as they remit to their 
mothers and sisters rather than to the men 
in their family. At the receiving end, female 
recipients tend to invest remittances in 
human capital, male recipients in physical 
capital. 
MacKay’s (2005) study on female migration 
from the Philippines is interesting because it 
takes a landscape approach to remittances, 
documenting how female migrants’ 
remittances are invested in agriculture by 
male recipients who shift the cropping 
pattern from subsistence to commercial 
crops. Such economically motivated 
changes in farming systems may, however, 
undermine long-term agricultural 
sustainability, and go against women’s 
general preferences for more mixed, but 
less immediately profitable crops.  
Thirdly, Wong (2006) explores the ‘gendered 
politics’ of remittances amongst Ghanaian 
transnational families, based on fieldwork in 
Ghana and Toronto. This is a highly nuanced 
analysis which conceptualises remittances 
as constituting gendered transnational 
relationships between senders and 
receivers which are constantly under 
negotiation. As transnational households 
form and reform in transitional kinship 
space, remittance dyads too become 
mobile. 
Finally, two contrasting Albanian studies 
help to lead us into our own study. In a 
previous piece of research led by one of the 
present authors (King et al. 2006), 
remittances were found to be highly 
constrained by the patriarchal norms of the 
traditionally conservative north Albanian 
highlands, where the migrant-origin 
fieldwork was conducted. Hence the 
remitters, in this case migrants in the 
London area, were all men and, even when 
their wives were working, the remittances 
were channelled to the husband’s family, 
reflecting the ‘ownership’ of the wife by the 
husband and his family after marriage. By 
contrast, Erin Smith’s (2009) research in 
Fier, which is a coastal region in south-
central Albania, and therefore less closed in 
on itself than the mountainous north, 
 8 
revealed substantial informal remittance 
practices amongst women (typically 
daughter to mother). These were variously 
seen as ‘filling the gap’ left by a lack of 
migrant sons (or by migrant sons who did 
not remit enough), or as ‘destroying’ the 
traditional and patriarchal clan system (the 
view of the older generations, especially 
men).  
Albania: Migration, Remittances, 
Patriarchy 
Tucked away in the Western Balkans and 
hemmed in by high mountains, Albania is 
one of the poorest, most remote and little-
known countries of Europe. For four decades 
it languished in almost total isolation under 
the hard-line communist regime of Enver 
Hoxha. Post-communist transition has been 
a difficult process, particularly in the 
economic realm: its GDP per capita, $3254 
(UNDP-Albania 2008), remains one of the 
lowest in Europe. Industry, heavily promoted 
by the state during the communist era, has 
collapsed. Agriculture continues to be a 
significant employer, but contributes little to 
GDP because of its subsistence nature. The 
country exports very little – except people. 
Since the early 1990s, the economy has 
been heavily dependent on remittances. 
Socio–economic development has been 
spatially very uneven since 1990, with 
increasing polarisation in the fast-expanding 
Tirana–Durrës area fuelled by internal 
migration, and depopulation occurring in the 
interior mountains, especially in the north 
and south of the country.  
Migration 
Migration since 1990 has been on a 
massive scale in relation to the population, 
and is all the more poignant given the 
previous 45 years of banishment of 
emigration (under pain of death) by one of 
the world’s harshest communist regimes. 
The collapse of communism triggered a 
natural curiosity to see the outside world, 
but most emigrants could be considered 
‘economic refugees’ fleeing economic 
collapse and an uncertain future (Barjaba 
and King 2005).  
Emigration has been continuous since 1990 
but has peaked at three moments of crisis 
when migrants have streamed 
uncontrollably out of the country, over the 
high mountain passes southwards into 
Greece, and across the narrow neck of the 
Adriatic Sea to the coast of southern Italy 
(King 2003). The first period of crisis was 
the early 1990s, accompanying and 
following the collapse of the communist 
regime. For two to three years both political 
and economic chaos reigned, and an 
estimated 200,000-300,000 people quit the 
country, nearly all of them to Albania’s two 
EU neighbours. The period 1993-96 was 
more stable and Albania enjoyed significant 
economic growth, sustained largely by 
swelling inflows of remittances. However, 
these were, in a way, the source of the 
second crisis moment, which struck in early 
1997 when several private investment 
schemes, which had flourished in the void 
left by the absence of a proper banking 
sector, and which offered unsustainably high 
interest rates (up to 50 percent), collapsed 
in a welter of corruption and unpaid debts. 
The bankrupting of maybe half of all 
Albanian households (both remittance-
investing migrants and many non-migrants 
who had put money into the schemes, often 
selling their fixed assets to do so) set off 
another wave of economically destitute 
migrants, who were also fleeing the 
breakdown of law and order in many parts of 
the country. The late 1990s then saw 
renewed economic stability and a steadying 
migration rate, until the third upset occurred 
in 1999-2000 with the refugee exodus from 
neighbouring Kosovo/a. Half a million ethnic 
Albanian Kosovans traipsed across the 
snowy mountains into north-east Albania, 
destabilising the economic and 
demographic situation of the poorest part of 
the country. Since 2000 emigration has 
fallen off, but still continues at a reduced 
rate (Azzarri and Carletto 2009: 409). 
The Government of Albania (2005) 
estimates a ‘stock’ of more than 1 million 
Albanians living abroad, having migrated 
since 1990. These include 600,000 in 
Greece, 250,000 in Italy and 50,000 in the 
UK. Examining the spatial distribution in the 
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intensity of emigration, this is shown to be 
highest in the southern part of the country, 
bordering Greece. However, no part of 
Albania has been unaffected by emigration 
(Zezza et al. 2005).  
Although Albanian migrants are drawn from 
all walks of life, including many with good 
levels of education, their employment in 
Greece has been almost entirely confined to 
the lower echelons of the labour market, in 
jobs which are increasingly rejected by 
indigenous Greek workers: agriculture, 
construction and factory work for men, and 
domestic and care sector work for women. 
Males predominated in the early years of 
migration to Greece, since crossing the 
border involved long and arduous treks, 
often at night. At that time virtually all 
Albanian migration to Greece was irregular. 
Since the regularisation schemes of 1998 
and 2001, Albanian migrants have been 
able to stabilise their position somewhat, 
and many women have joined their 
husbands, usually taking their children with 
them (but sometimes leaving them behind in 
the care of grandparents). Other children are 
born in Greece. 
Remittances  
Migration has produced an influx of 
remittances into Albania which have been 
consistently growing apart from two blips, 
one in 1997 caused by the savings scam 
and the other in 2008 due mainly to the 
global economic crisis. Remittances rose 
from $275 million in 1993 to a peak of $1.3 
billion in 2007.4  
Throughout this period, they have 
contributed between 10 and 22 percent of 
GDP (Uruçi 2008). Remittances have 
consistently outweighed the foreign 
exchange earned from exports (by more 
                                                 
4 Remittance figures here are from the Bank of Albania 
(BoA), whose data are also used by the World Bank. The 
BoA calculates remittances as the difference between 
foreign currency coming in and that going out. This 
calculation does not exclude the possibility that income 
from ‘suspicious activities’, such as trafficking, is also 
included (de Zwager et al. 2005: 21). BoA remittance 
estimates include remittances sent through both formal 
and informal channels. The latter have generally accounted 
for the majority of remittances, although the formal share 
has been growing, especially after the pyramids fiasco of 
1997.  
than twice in many years), effectively making 
labour the country’s most important export 
(de Zwager et al. 2005: 21). At the 
household and local level, remittances have 
been responsible for lifting families and 
communities out of poverty, as numerous 
studies have confirmed (Arrehag et al. 
2005; De Soto et al. 2002; de Zwager et al. 
2005; Frashëri 2007; Zezza et al. 2005). 
Lerch and Wanner (2006) used the Albanian 
Living Standards Measurement Survey to 
show that remittances produced a ‘levelling 
up’ of poorer families, contributing thus to 
greater income equality. 
However, there are limits to the extent to 
which remittances can be considered a 
viable development strategy. As emigration 
‘matures’ and levels off, and as the 
emigrants themselves either return or, 
increasingly settle long-term abroad with 
their families, the remittance flows will 
eventually decline. As noted above, this 
happened in 2008, although it is not clear to 
what extent this was a natural ‘beginning of 
the end’ of the remittances boom, or 
triggered by the global economic crisis (King 
and Vullnetari 2009b). Either way, a decline 
in remittances was predicted by de Zwager 
et al. (2005: 51) five years ago. The same 
authors assume, on the basis of their 
empirical survey data, that a return wave will 
start around 14-18 years after the onset of 
mass migration, and again this is starting to 
happen (Germenji and Milo 2009; 
Labrianidis and Hatziprokopiou 2005; 
Nicholson 2004).  
Patriarchy 
Traditional Albanian society embodies an 
extreme form of patriarchy distinguished by 
patrilineality (membership in the family 
follows the male line), patrilocality (upon 
marriage women move from the family of 
their father to that of their husband’s 
father), strong blood ties, blood feuds, and 
bride price. According to Halpern et al. 
(1996), both gender and age play a crucial 
role in structuring the social system, based 
on rigid hierarchical values. Males have 
supremacy within society; women are 
subordinated within the context of a 
‘protective’ family. In terms of age, older 
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males have authority over younger ones: 
hence fathers over sons, older over younger 
brothers. Likewise with females, with the 
result that the youngest wife in the family 
has the least power, and on a day-to-day 
basis may be particularly ‘oppressed’ by her 
mother-in-law. The youngest son and his 
wife are responsible for taking care of his 
(but not her) elderly parents; this has 
impacts on migration and remittance 
behaviour.  
This ‘traditional’, generalised picture must 
be nuanced by both historical change and 
regional variation. Most of the features 
described above have been documented 
particularly in northern Albania (see Backer 
1983; Durham 2000; Shryock 1988; 
Whitaker 1981; Young 2000), and have 
been ascribed to the survival there of a rigid 
code of customary regulations and practices 
known as the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini. De 
Waal (2005: 254) describes the Kanun as a 
‘complete moral and legal framework’ for life 
and society. Central and southern Albania 
were also subject to ‘canons’ but their 
influence waned relatively early with the 
subsequent result of less rigid gender and 
generational relations. South Albanian 
society was based on compact village 
communities, not dispersed hamlets bound 
by extensive clan structures as in the north. 
Compared to the remote mountain fastness 
of the north, the southern regions were 
geographically more open, with wider valleys 
and corridors. It was from the south that the 
pre-communist emigration flows, which went 
mainly to the United States in the early 
twentieth century, originated. This opened 
up the southern region to outside influences 
through return migration and social 
remittances. 
The historical narrative of gender relations is 
dominated by the effects of the communist 
era which changed much, but not 
everything, and certainly not some of the 
underlying mindsets of patriarchy. At the eve 
of World War Two the situation of women in 
Albania was dire, due to the minimal 
success of the Zog government’s efforts to 
improve gender equality. More than 90 
percent of women were illiterate (nearly 100 
percent in northern areas), girls constituted 
only 3 percent of secondary school students, 
and there were only 21 female teachers in 
the whole country (Hall 1994: 83; Logoreci 
1977: 157-8). 
Women’s emancipation was a key aim of the 
communist regime. The various provisions of 
the 1946 constitution and other subsequent 
legislation gave Albanian women 
unprecedented rights for a ‘traditional’ 
society. Female illiteracy had fallen to 8 
percent by 1989, when females made up 
nearly half of the university students, 80 
percent of women were in employment, and 
women made up 30 percent of the 
representatives of the People’s Assembly 
(Brunnbauer 2000; Gjonça et al. 2008). 
Despite these achievements, in other 
respects change was much slower, and the 
roots of patriarchy in the private sphere 
were not fundamentally shaken. Working 
women endured a ‘double burden’ of daily 
work in the cooperative and factory, and 
responsibility at home for cooking, cleaning 
and childcare.5 
The collapse of the communist regime 
affected women quite adversely. The 
‘substitutable social orders’ that emerged 
were based on the reinvention of tradition 
and patriarchy (Schwandner-Sievers 2006: 
224). As Nixon (2006) suggests, the post-
communist transition was accompanied by 
‘highly oppositional gender roles’: the public 
sphere as the domain of men wherein 
manliness was idealised as strong, decisive 
and profit-making, reflected also in a 
masculinist political culture of bragging and 
intimidation; and the private sphere as the 
domain of femininity with values of 
domesticity, caring and childrearing. The 
concept of women’s emancipation was 
associated with a now-rejected communist 
past which had sought to destroy the family. 
Women’s representation in parliament 
dropped below 10 percent; female 
employment rates fell to less than 50 
percent; their wages were only two-thirds 
                                                 
5 Some scholars have argued that women’s emancipation 
in communist countries was not an end in itself, but a tool 
used to facilitate political goals (Brunnbauer 2000). In one 
sense Enver Hoxha can be seen as the ultimate patriarch, 
and the female members of the People’s Assembly as 
tokens.  
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those of men. Men now own 92 percent of 
all property in the country and account for 
84 percent of GDP (UNDP-Albania 2008: 
13).  
Places and Methods 
This research is focussed on the migration 
and remittance ‘corridor’ linking a cluster of 
three villages in south-east Albania with the 
northern Greek city of Thessaloniki. The 
three villages lie at an altitude of 850 
metres in a wide valley to the north of Korçë, 
the main regional centre of south-east 
Albania. The soils are fertile, allowing a 
potentially varied and productive agriculture; 
apple orchards are a particular local 
specialisation. The area has a 
Mediterranean mountain climate with warm 
to hot and mostly dry summers. However, at 
this altitude, the winter climate is severe, 
with frequent frosts and snowfall.  
The Korçë region scores amongst the 
highest in Albania for both internal out-
migration, 60 percent of which is to Tirana, 
and emigration, which is overwhelmingly to 
Greece (Carletto et al. 2004: 27). The 
villages lie close to a major motorway which 
connects southwards to the Kapshticë 
border crossing for Greece. Northwards the 
road leads to Pogradec and Lake Ohrid. The 
three villages have a combined population 
of 7,000, according to the local population 
registers. This may be an overestimation, 
due to high levels of outmigration, including 
seasonal and temporary migration to 
Greece. The villages have been deeply 
affected by outmigration in the last two 
decades. Emigration has affected all 
components of the villages’ mixed 
populations of Muslims, Christian Orthodox, 
and Roma and Evgjit (‘gypsy’) people. The 
Roma and Evgjit are generally the poorest 
and most marginalised of the villages’ 
households.  
Thessaloniki, the second city of Greece, is 
home to a large number of migrants from 
the three villages. With a population of about 
1 million, the city is the closest major urban 
employment centre, being about four hours 
away by car (longer by bus), although long 
delays can occur if there are queues at the 
border checkpoint. Characteristic sectors of 
employment for male Albanian migrants in 
Thessaloniki are the building industry, small-
scale manufacturing plants, painting and 
decorating, removal firms and other 
unskilled or semi-skilled labouring jobs. For 
women, domestic cleaning, child-minding, 
elderly care, and, like men, small-scale 
manufacturing and commercial enterprises 
are the main employment sectors 
(Hatziprokopiou 2003: 1043-44). 
Field data were gathered from both 
locations: the migrant-sending remittance-
receiving villages, and Thessaloniki. Two 
main data-gathering instruments were used: 
 350 questionnaires administered face-to-
face with remittance-recipient 
families/households in the villages; 
 45 in-depth interviews, 25 (17F and 8M) 
with village-based remittance-receiving 
migrant households, and 20 (14M, 3F 
and 3M/F couples) in Thessaloniki. 
These surveys were carried out in the first 
half of 2008, preceded by a pilot visit to 
check out locations, feasibility, contacts etc. 
in November 2007. In addition, further 
interviews were carried out with key 
informants, stakeholders, NGO personnel 
etc. in both countries. Finally, four focus-
group discussions were held: two with these 
key informants in Thessaloniki and two with 
migrant-household recipients of remittances 
in the villages in Albania.  
Regarding the selection of the village 
households to be surveyed, two criteria were 
followed: firstly that they must have at least 
one member of the family living and working 
in Greece (not necessarily in Thessaloniki); 
and second, that they must receive 
remittances. The remittance recipient – who 
was not necessarily the head of the 
household – was selected as the 
interlocutor for the survey. The interviewees 
in the villages were a subsample of those to 
whom the questionnaire was administered, 
strategically selected for both the range and 
representativeness of their circumstances 
and experiences; and subject, of course, to 
their willingness to cooperate. The in-depth 
interviews included also a few returnees 
 12 
who did not participate in the questionnaire, 
but who were chosen in order to consider 
the effect of return and remittances on 
business development. For the selection of 
the interviewees in Thessaloniki, two criteria 
were again followed: that they should 
originate from the Korçë area (not 
necessarily from the three villages 
surveyed); and that they must be sending 
remittances to Albania. Respondents both in 
the villages and in Thessaloniki included 
men and women in order to allow for gender-
based comparisons. 
In this paper we use the questionnaire data 
to set out the broad parameters of the 
gendered remittances channels, and the 
interview narratives to enlighten specifics of 
this process, including illustrative case-
studies. For reasons of confidentiality we do 
not identify the villages, and all names of 
interviewees are pseudonyms. 
Further ethical implications of this research 
must also be recognised. Questionnaire and 
interview participants were assured full 
confidentiality and anonymity and the 
principle of informed consent was vigorously 
followed. We encountered an 
understandable degree of reluctance to 
divulge too many personal details, especially 
regarding financial matters. Possible biases 
in replies to questions about remittances 
amounts worked in different directions. In 
some cases we were aware of families who 
might want to exaggerate their poverty (and 
therefore to downplay sums sent from 
abroad) in the belief that the government 
and local authority might award them certain 
benefits. In other cases respondents were 
evidently afraid that the interviewer might be 
from the tax office. In yet other instances 
respondents might have wanted to give the 
impression that the remitter – a ‘dutiful son’ 
– was ‘successful’ and supporting them 
according to the required custom, whereas 
perhaps this was not the case. Similar 
concerns about giving financial information 
were raised by interviewees in Thessaloniki. 
All this means that remittance data must be 
treated with caution. 
 
Types of Remittance Households 
The typology of households in Albania 
affected by migration has evolved against 
the background of traditional compositions 
of patriarchal family structures, especially 
the extended, multi-generational form, and 
reflects ongoing gendered and generation-
specific cultural responsibilities of migrants 
and the various family members. The impact 
of migration on origin-country households 
also depends on migrants’ success in 
accessing different types of gendered work 
abroad and their access to work permits and 
visas. First we consider remittance-receiving 
households, second remittance-sending 
households. Gender, and also generation, 
are shown to be important structuring 
variables, both in the way households are 
affected by migration and – as we shall see 
later – in the way remittances are 
transmitted and deployed. 
Remittance-receiving households 
Three female-headed household types were 
identified amongst the sample of remittance 
recipients. 
 Type 1. These are de facto female-
headed households. The women live with 
their children in the village, whilst their 
husbands live and work most of the year 
in Greece, returning several times a year 
for visits. The husband remains the 
nominal head, despite being away. 
Generally, the family looks forward to a 
reunification, either in Albania or in 
Greece; the latter is the more likely 
prospect if the husband earns a good-
living there, and his papers are in order. 
This was the most numerous type of 
remittance-receiving female-headed 
household in our study. 
 Type 2. This is similar to Type 1, except 
that the woman heads the household 
temporarily, due to the fact that the 
husband works in Greece seasonally – for 
up to six months during the year – 
returning to live with his family in the 
village the rest of the time. 
 Type 3. This is when the woman is a 
widow and is supported by remittances 
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from one or more sons (usually) or 
daughters (rarely). She may be living 
alone or with various combinations of 
younger-generation family members, for 
instance with young grandchildren of her 
sons (and sometimes daughters) who are 
working abroad, or with her grandchildren 
and daughter-in-law if the son works 
abroad on his own (because he is 
undocumented and cannot access well-
paid work or reunite his family there), or 
with other unmarried (or divorced) sons 
and daughters. 
Likewise, three male-headed household 
types were identified from our survey data: 
 Type 1. The most typical household 
consists of a multi-generation family 
where mature-age or elderly parents live 
with their children and grandchildren, and 
where there is at least one son who has 
migrated to Greece and sends 
remittances. 
 Type 2. Here we find elderly couples or 
widowers who live on their own. All their 
children have emigrated, or migrated 
internally, and live in these destinations 
with their children, usually in nuclear 
households. Despite the fact of living on 
their own, elderly parents are the care 
responsibility of their youngest son (and 
his wife), according to Albanian custom. 
Therefore, the youngest son may well be 
the principal remittance-sender and, 
again according to tradition, should be 
the one (with his wife) to administer more 
direct care when that is necessary. 
However, other sons (and sometimes 
daughters) may send remittances; often 
these are denoted as ‘gifts’ rather than 
obligations. 
 Type 3. Cases where the husband is the 
remittance-receiver from his migrant wife 
are rare but not unknown: two cases in 
our sample survey of 350.  
Also rare are instances of child-headed 
households. This situation sometimes 
occurs amongst the Roma community as a 
temporary expedient. In such cases both 
parents of a nuclear family migrate to work 
in Greece for a few weeks (maximum three 
months), and the children are left on their 
own. Usually, a teenage son or daughter 
leaves school to look after the youngest 
siblings. Older relatives in the village help 
them manage the remittances sent by the 
parents. 
Remittance-sending households 
Yet again, three is the magic number. In 
Thessaloniki, the following types of 
family/household context were identified, all 
male-headed. 
 Type 1. This is the typical migrant nuclear 
family of parents with or without children 
(if there are no children yet, they are 
‘expected’ to be produced sooner rather 
than later). This nuclear unit may also 
host a male relative, usually the 
husband’s brother. All (husband, wife, 
brother) may be involved in sending 
money to the husband’s parents. 
 Type 2 occurs when the nuclear family is 
joined by the migrant’s parents (usually 
the husband’s parents), who are the 
grandparents of the children. The oldest 
male living in the family in Greece is 
generally considered as the household 
head, even though he may not be 
contributing most, or indeed anything to 
the family’s income. In another variant of 
this multi-generation type, just the 
grandmother joins the family in Greece, 
especially if she is widowed.6 
Grandparents take care of child-rearing, 
cooking and cleaning, thereby freeing the 
wife to work full-time. 
 Type 3. This is when young single men 
live on their own, or share a household 
with other single men who are their 
friends or relatives. Some of these ‘single’ 
men may have wives and families back in 
Albania.  
The types of migrant households present in 
Greece reflect the male-led migration 
typology from Albania, and are further 
backed up by official data. According to the 
2001 Greek census, 65 percent of Albanian 
                                                 
6 We have written separately on this phenomenon of 
‘migrating grannies’ as it is known in Albania (King and 
Vullnetari 2006).  
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migrant households in Greece were couples 
with or without children – classic nuclear 
households. Only 14 percent lived in multi-
member unrelated households (Baldwin-
Edwards and Kolios 2008: 12-13). Despite a 
trend towards greater gender-equality in 
migrant households in Greece (which we will 
evidence later), no female-headed 
households were interviewed in our survey.7 
Changes in household typologies due to 
migration 
The household typologies outlined above are 
far from static. They change over time, due 
both to the life-cycle evolution of families 
and households, and to macro-scale factors 
structuring Albanian migration to Greece. In 
the early 1990s, Albanian migration was 
dominated by young men, who lived together 
in precarious conditions in male households 
in Greece. In urban centres like Athens and 
Thessaloniki, they lived crammed in run-
down buildings in degraded neighbourhoods 
near the city centre (see Iosifides and King 
1998). In rural Greece they lived in barns 
and abandoned cottages. 
The 1998 regularisation, and subsequent 
schemes, enabled Albanian migrants, still 
predominantly males, to access better paid 
and more stable jobs, and to afford better 
living conditions. Regularisation also paved 
the way for a longer-term settlement project 
in Greece and for family reunion. The sex 
ratio of Albanian migrants in Greece 
changed  from 17 percent females before 
the regularisation to 40 percent at the 2001 
Census (King 2003: 297). The nuclear 
family became the norm, accounting, as 
noted above, for two-thirds of Albanian 
households in Greece in 2001. Migrants 
became more integrated in Greece, 
speaking the language increasingly fluently 
and overcoming the entrenched xenophobia 
(or ‘albanophobia’) towards Albanians which 
has become less ‘heavy’ in the 2000s 
compared to the situation in the 1990s. 
                                                 
7 We came across a ‘female’ household composed of two 
highly educated sisters and a younger brother living in 
Thessaloniki. The elder sister had been the pioneer 
migrant, providing support for the subsequent migration, 
first, of her sister, and then her brother. We did not 
interview the migrants themselves, as their father, back in 
the village, was opposed to the idea.  
The increasingly common nuclear family 
became a unit where other male relatives 
(brothers, cousins) could also be 
accommodated, usually short-term. The only 
female would cook, clean, do the washing 
etc. whilst the men went out to work, usually 
in physically demanding jobs. This 
household type persists today (see above), 
although it is less common as the Albanian 
migration to Greece reaches a mature stage, 
with the ‘second generation’, born in Greece 
or brought in as young children, now moving 
through the school system. 
More common is the situation where the 
nuclear family becomes the base for a multi-
generation family, with the addition of 
grandparents, particularly grandmothers, 
who look after the migrants’ children. Nearly 
always it is the husband’s parents who 
come. The older generation joins the family 
for a few months, one or two years, or even 
more, depending on their ability to obtain 
visas and stay permits. Grandparents are 
often the only link that the migrants’ 
children have with their cultures of origin. 
Generally the addition of grandparents 
fosters inter-generational family cohesion 
although tensions often arise between 
mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law.8 
It is important to stress that these changes 
in the shape and positioning of Albanian 
households brought about by migration are 
structured very much within Albanian 
traditional norms. The migrant son/husband 
is the base of the ‘new’ household, so it is 
his relatives (parents, brothers, cousins) 
who join the family in Greece; the wife is 
detached from her parental family and her 
care responsibilities are to her husband, his 
parents and single male relatives, should 
they join the household. 
Care and Transnational Family 
Cohesion 
Alongside flows of remittances are shifting 
patterns of inter-generational care, brought 
                                                 
8 Such conflicts have always existed in Albanian 
households. Indeed in other research we have documented 
how part of the benefit of migration considered from the 
point of view of young married women is their ‘liberation’ 
from petty squabbles with their mothers-in-law (King and 
Vullnetari 2009a).  
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about by migration’s rupture of the 
traditional geographical proximity of 
generations within families. Most Albanian 
women who work in Greece provide care for 
local Greek families, as domestic helpers or 
looking after elderly Greeks. Meanwhile the 
migrant women’s own children need care 
during work hours; this is provided by other 
Albanian migrant women – often ‘active’ 
grandmothers in their 50s or 60s – who also 
look after household chores. However, the 
Albanian-Greek ‘regional care chain’ may 
break, and result in ‘care drain’, if some 
elderly parents/grandparents, typically in 
their 70s or older, are stuck in Albania with 
no-one to care for them. They may become 
trapped either by their own fragility and 
failing health, or there may be travel and 
visa restrictions on them being able to move, 
or a combination of both factors. In Albania 
care provision from the state or private 
institutions is very limited, and in rural areas 
practically non-existent. Under the tight, 
patriarchal family structure described 
earlier, families have traditionally looked 
after their young, the elderly and the sick. 
But, with sons and daughters(-in-law) 
abroad, many elderly in rural Albania are 
finding themselves ‘abandoned’: they may 
receive remittances but lack hands-on care 
and direct and frequent contact with their 
younger-generation family members (King 
and Vullnetari 2006; Vullnetari and King 
2008). 
Of course, transnational family links are 
maintained, and in a variety of ways. First of 
all, there is frequent telephone contact – 
usually at least once a week. More than 90 
percent of the respondent families in rural 
Albania have a mobile phone, and a third 
have a fixed telephone line. Second, there is 
a growing use of the Internet and email 
amongst the Albanian transnational 
community. However, this channel of 
communication is used to a much lesser 
extent with relatives in the rural areas of 
origin – indeed none of our survey 
respondents had an internet connection – 
reflecting low levels of computer literacy 
amongst rural households. 
Third, there are visits by the migrants to their 
families in Albania. Because of visa 
difficulties, visits in the opposite direction 
are much less common. Migrants generally 
visit their families three times a year: during 
the Greek Orthodox Easter, for the summer 
holiday, and at Christmas and New Year. 
Those who live far away – for instance in 
Athens, or Patras, or the islands – may visit 
less frequently.9 On the other hand, those 
who live in the northern Greek border area, 
and as far across as Thessaloniki, may visit 
more frequently, perhaps as often as once a 
month, and effectively live between the two 
countries. Other visits may take place for 
special life events such as marriages, births 
and funerals, or in response to illness of a 
family member. 
Greek immigration regulations condition 
visits made by migrants and their families 
between Greece and Albania. The most 
common problem for migrants is the 
availability of up-to-date stay permits. It may 
take the Greek authorities up to two years to 
process and renew such permits, by which 
time the new permit itself may even have 
expired. This bureaucratic play and general 
inefficiency inhumanely separates migrants 
from their families, causing them sometimes 
to miss important events such as the 
funerals of their parents (King and Vullnetari 
2006; Psimmenos and Kassimati 2003). 
This leads to the fourth means of 
transnational family contact, which is the 
proxy-like behaviour of migrant friends who 
visit the parents of others from the village 
who cannot travel. They transport money, 
medicines, gifts and objects of affection 
between the two parts of the family. Only 
trusted friends and relatives (cousins etc.) 
engage in this substitute contact and care 
activity. This is especially important for 
hand-carry remittances, since personal 
transport of money is cost-efficient.  
In order to give our account a more ‘human’ 
dimension, here is a fairly typical case-study 
from our interview data. It illustrates 
interactions between migration, generations, 
gender, care and remittances – 
interlinkages which will be developed more 
fully in the following sections of the paper. 
                                                 
9 Likewise, migrants in Greece whose homes are in 
northern Albania may visit less often.  
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Nexhi (wife, 63) and Bedri (husband, 68) live 
on their own in one of the three fieldwork 
villages. They have three sons, all married 
and living with their families in separate 
nuclear households in Athens. The couple’s 
income consists of their old-age pensions – 
a joint total of 15,000 lek per month (€120) 
– together with the rent from some 
agricultural land that they let out, and the 
remittances that their sons bring with them 
when they visit, usually twice a year. These 
remittances are not large – about €100 is 
left on each visit – because the sons have 
their own families in Greece to support. The 
sons, aged in their late 30s and early 40s, 
have been living in Greece for around 15 
years and their children, aged between 2 
and 12 years, are, or will be, enrolled in the 
Greek education system. The two eldest 
sons have bought their own flats in Athens – 
a sign of settlement in the host country. 
They have also bought building plots in 
Tirana. This confirms that, although settled 
in Greece, they have not severed links with 
Albania. Investment of their remittances and 
savings in property is a measure of social 
insurance against their own old age and 
against the possible insecurity of their 
immigration status and unemployment in 
Greece. The youngest son, who has the duty 
of care towards the parents, is keeping his 
options open for the time being. All three 
sons plan to stay in Greece for the 
foreseeable future, especially because their 
children are at school. During their visits to 
see their parents in the village, they also 
bring in-kind remittances such as clothes 
and medicines. The elderly parents 
themselves lived in Athens for two years a 
few years ago, but returned to their village 
because they found life in the Greek capital 
difficult. They did not speak the language, 
although they did learn to navigate the city 
on public transport. It was mainly Bedri who 
was bored and unhappy. Nexhi, on the other 
hand, was quite happy because she was 
looking after the grandchildren and the flat 
of their son, and so felt she had a purpose in 
life. 
 
 
Remittance Transmission Channels 
Several possible means exists for migrants 
to convey remittances back to Albania: 
hand-carry, either by the migrants 
themselves or via relatives and friends; paid 
courier; banks; and money transfer 
operators (MTOs). Before we consider these 
through our survey and interview-data, we 
describe how the transfer mechanisms have 
changed over time.  
During the early 1990s the main ways in 
which Albanian migrants in Greece used to 
send money home were by bringing it 
themselves on return visits, sending it via 
relatives or friends, or by using a paid 
courier, who was usually a taxi driver. Four 
reasons accounted for this preferred set of 
transfer mechanisms. First, migrants were 
mostly irregular at the time, so that choosing 
formal channels of transmission such as 
banks was either impossible or very risky. 
Second, formal channels were, in any case, 
limited, bureaucratic, and often not ‘open’ to 
migrants’ business. Third, geographical 
proximity meant that taking the cash by 
hand during visits was easy. Fourth, many 
migrants in those years worked short-term 
or seasonally in Greece and preferred to 
bring the money with them when they 
returned at the end of the temporary work 
period. 
However, these methods had risks 
associated with them. During the early 
1990s and again in 1997-98, Albania was 
gripped by political turmoil, civil disorder and 
reduced authority of the law. Especially after 
the arms depots were looted in 1997, gangs 
of gun-toting brigands raided the main 
roads, especially those close to the border 
crossings to Greece. Returning migrants 
were regarded as easy targets since it was 
known they were carrying cash. Cards and 
long-distance buses carrying migrants were 
frequently ambushed. This was the point 
when MTOs such as Western Union and 
Money Gram, seeing lucrative business 
opportunities, entered the remittance-
transfer market, offering safer and 
guaranteed services – but with a not-
insignificant commission fee. Later on, the 
Greek banks became aware of the market 
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potential and offered similar services. This 
competition brought down the transaction 
costs and time.  
Moving now to our own data, the following 
was the situation amongst our respondents 
as reported in the 2008 field survey. 
 Hand-carry. More than 90 percent of 
respondents indicated this to be the 
most common method of conveying 
remittances in Albania. This preference 
was backed up by in-depth interviews in 
Thessaloniki. The ‘carrying’ takes place 
when the migrant returns for a visit, or, 
for those who are temporary/seasonal 
workers, at the end of the working 
season. Regularisation of increasing 
numbers of migrants has allowed them 
to visit more frequently, three times a 
year or more, thereby giving plenty of 
opportunities for carrying money back. 
On the other hand, as migration matures 
and the male migrant is joined by his 
wife and children, leaving behind only 
elderly parents, remitted amounts have 
declined, and migrants consider it is not 
worthwhile putting the rather small sums 
they send through formal channels. An 
important point to note: in most cases 
hand-carrying is done by men. 
 Relatives or friends. This is the second 
most important method of transmitting 
cash to Albania: 27 percent of survey 
respondents said their family member(s) 
abroad sent money through relatives or 
friends. As migration becomes further 
established, many migrants live in 
communities where they are surrounded 
by friends, relatives and acquaintances 
from their village or local area. If a 
migrant is not able to travel to Albania 
because of work commitments or lack of 
documentation, they will nearly always 
find a trusted person to take their money 
home. Given the closeness of the 
villages to Thessaloniki, there is a steady 
traffic of migrants between these points. 
Often migrants in Thessaloniki (or other 
major towns) will go to the bus station 
where buses leave for Albania every day, 
and will look for someone they know who 
is travelling to their village. Respondents 
emphasised that no monetary payment 
was made to the person who carried the 
money. Perhaps the sender would buy 
the carried a beer to say ‘thanks’, but 
most often the ‘debt’ would be paid back 
through reciprocal action. Note again, 
this is mostly a male ‘thing’. 
 Paid courier. This is less expensive than 
MTOs, and easier especially as it does 
not require any paperwork. There several 
types of individuals who offer the courier 
service: taxi drivers and bus drivers who 
regularly transport people between the 
two countries, and also small 
businessmen such as shopkeepers or 
lorry-owners who ply the same route. A 
typical scenario is that a migrant will go 
to the bus station where buses leave for 
Albania and give the driver a package 
with the name of someone who will meet 
the bus at the other end to pick up the 
consignment. In the early 1990s Greek 
taxi drivers went back and forth since 
they had the documentation to work 
both sides of the border. Albanian taxi 
drivers have taken over much of this 
business now. Trust is at the basis of 
these informal transactions; often the 
drivers are from the village or area, and 
are recommended by a friend or relative. 
The money arrives at the destination the 
same or the next day. The service is 
usually carried out for a flat fee of €10 
for any sum remitted. Yet again, we note 
the exclusive male gender of the drivers. 
From our survey 3 percent used paid 
couriers, although this method was more 
widely used in the past. 
 Banks. In our survey only 2 percent (six 
respondents) used banks to receive 
remittances. Two main factors help 
explain the low use of banks in Albania 
generally: the legacy of the cash 
economy inherited from the communist 
years, and the collapse of the infamous 
savings schemes in 1997. The cash 
economy was inherited into the 
transition years and in 2005 cash 
payments still accounted for 95 percent 
of all retail transfers (Hernández-Cross et 
al. 2006: 11). The fiasco of the savings 
pyramids destroyed the embryonic 
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financial experience and trust in the local 
banking system that had been building in 
the early and mid-1990s. Its 
consequences are felt more than a 
decade later, especially by rural people 
and by those who lost large sums. 
Besides these general factors, migrants 
tend to perceive banks as too 
complicated and bureaucratic for their 
needs. Their limited opening hours make 
access difficult for migrants working 
fixed and long hours. However, our 
respondents who had used banks spoke 
of improved quality and range of services 
in very recent times. In Albania, banks 
exist only in urban centres, whereas 
most of the population in households 
with migrants abroad lives in the 
countryside.  
 MTOs. The world’s two largest money 
transfer companies, Western Union (WU) 
and Money Gram (MG), are present in 
Albania since 1998 and 2004 
respectively. They have more than 300 
outlets between them and in 2005 
accounted for 78 percent of the total 
remittances transferred through formal 
channels (Kring 2007: 15). The fees 
charged are relatively high; however, 
their instant service appeals in situations 
where money needs to be transferred 
fast, with maximum guarantee. A 
transfer of €150 from Greece to Albania 
costs €14.50 through MG and €15.25 
with WU, both for delivering within 10 
minutes. Ten percent of our respondents 
said that they had received remittances 
via WU or MG. The reasons for using 
MTOs related to situations where money 
was needed urgently, for instance for 
expenses surrounding illness or death. 
For Roma and others living in dire 
poverty, this method ensured a regular 
money supply to those with no other 
resources to fall back on. It thus appears 
that the poorest and most vulnerable pay 
the highest prices, the standard 
commission being up to 10 percent.  
 
Amounts and Frequency of 
Remittances 
The questionnaire data reveal that 
remittance sums are highly significant. The 
total amount received by the 350 village 
households surveyed stands at around €1 
million per year, an average of €2600 per 
household. Table 1 gives the details, and 
shows that more than 60 percent of the 
households receive between €1000 and 
€4000 per year in remittances. Key 
informants suggest that around 40 percent 
of the villages’ households receive 
remittances from abroad.10 
Table 2 looks at frequency of remitting, 
divided according to whether the remittance 
receiver is the wife of the migrant or some 
other relative (father, mother etc.). Overall 
just over half (55 percent) the respondents 
received remittances every three to six 
months. This correlates with the key times 
that migrants visit their family in Albania – 
usually three times a year. The next most 
important frequency is once a year. This may 
reflect the maturing of Albanian migration to 
Greece, whereby migrants and their nuclear 
families are progressively settling in Greece 
long-term, leaving just their elderly parents 
behind, whom they visit less frequently 
(usually to the regret of their parents, 
however – see King and Vullnetari 2006). 
Finally, one in ten respondents report that 
they receive remittances as and when they 
need money. 
A gendered breakdown of the data in Table 
2 reveals that households administered by 
wives receive remittances more frequently 
than other types of households. Not only 
that, wives also receive more than any other 
type of remittance receiver (Table 3). Table 
4 shows the age-group of the recipient 
respondents. Women are in the majority of 
respondents overall (58 percent) but are 
disproportionally dominant in younger age 
groups (for instance in the age-range 26-45 
only three respondents are men, compared
                                                 
10 There is also the possibility that remittances are received 
through the internal migration of family members to Tirana 
or elsewhere in Albania. We did not collect data on internal 
remittances. To the extent that they exist, they are 
undoubtedly of much less importance than foreign 
remittances.  
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Table 1. Frequency distribution of annual remittances 
 
Annual remittances (in euros) no. % 
less than 1000 66 18.9 
1000- 2000 139 39.7 
2001-4000 76 21.7 
4001-6000 44 12.6 
6001-8000 19 5.4 
more than 8000 6 1.7 
Source: Authors’ survey (n=350) 
 
Table 2. Frequency of receiving remittances by remittance receiver 
 
 total wife non-wife 
Frequency  no. % no. % no. % 
once a month or more 30 8.6   15   15.0 15 6.0 
every two months 31 8.9   12   12.0 19 7.6 
every three to six months 194 55.4   61   61.0 133 53.2 
once a year 58 16.6     3     3.0 55 22 
as needed by the hh 37 10.6     9     9.0 28 11.2 
Total 350 100.0 100 100.0 250 100.0 
Source: Authors’ survey 
 
Table 3. Average remittances per year (in euros) by type of receiver 
 
Remittance receiver no. mean std. dev 
Total sample 350 2596 2144 
Wife 100 3152 1973 
Father 143 2518 2116 
Mother   98 2226 2325 
Other (brother, sister, grandparent)     9 1678    868 
Source: Authors’ survey 
 
Table 4. Age-groups of remittance recipients by sex 
 
 total M F 
Age-group  no. % no. % no. % 
under 25 10   2.9   1 0.7 9 4.5 
26-35 36 10.3   2 1.4 34 16.8 
36-45 53 15.1   1 0.7 52 25.7 
46-55 84 24.0 30 20.3 54 26.7 
56-65 84 24.0 57 38.5 27 13.4 
66-75 71 20.3 51 34.5 20 9.9 
76+ 12   3.4   6 4.1 6 3.0 
totals 350 100.0 148 100.0 202 100.0 
Source: Authors’ survey 
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to 86 females). By contrast, males are in 
the clear majority as older recipients. A 
preliminary reading of these tabulated data 
would suggest that, if we use remittance 
administration as a proxy for gendered 
decision-making within the family, we can 
observe a more patriarchal model operating 
at older ages, whereas male emigration is 
emancipatory for women who remain in the 
village because they are now administering 
the household finances. However, our in-
depth material suggests that this is an 
oversimplification. Not only do men 
continue to hold on to a high degree of 
decision-making even when they live 
abroad, but women in the village often feel 
overburdened with all the responsibilities 
they are now shouldering – running the 
household, looking after children and their 
education, and perhaps working in the 
fields and keeping livestock too.11 In the 
next section we unpack these gendered 
dynamics of remittance sending and 
receiving in more systematic detail.  
Profiles of Remitters and Receivers 
The previous tables have provided some 
indicative data on how remittances are 
transmitted along highly gendered 
channels. A closer inspection of the 
questionnaire responses and, especially, 
the interview narratives, reveals a number 
of gendered remittance mechanisms which 
reflect, on the one hand, the strongly 
patriarchal nature of Albanian society 
(especially rural society), and on the other 
hand, the gendered mechanisms of 
migration to Greece. These migration 
processes in turn reflect a complementary 
duality of factors. First, there is, once again, 
the traditionally gendered expectation of 
males migrating inherited from the pre-
communist practice of kurbet, whereby 
males migrated to provide for the family, 
whilst women and children stayed at home 
(King and Vullnetari 2003: 17-19). Second, 
there is the Greek migration ‘policy’ of only 
permitting (by not controlling it) irregular 
migration up to 1998, thereby forcing 
                                                 
11 Kunz (2008: 1405) found exactly the same excessive 
burden imposed on female remittance receivers in rural 
Mexico.  
migrants into hazardous journeys on foot 
across the mountains, often on ‘secret’ 
trails and under the cover of night. Such 
arduous treks were usually only undertaken 
by men and teenage boys.12  
In the following account of the types of 
remittance patterns observed amongst the 
respondents, we focus first on males as 
remitters, and then on females.  
Migrant men as remitters 
 From the long-term migrant to his wife 
and children in the village. 
In this type, the migrant is in Greece long-
term and makes visits home as 
circumstances permit. The family in Albania 
is usually nuclear, obviously with the father 
away most of the time. Sometimes the 
husband’s parent(s) will be living with the 
family; however, the older generation may 
be in need of care. Thus, family duties and 
responsibilities are de facto taken over by 
the wife. Remittances to this type of 
household are amongst the highest in our 
survey, and generally tend to be the main, 
or indeed the only, income source for the 
family in the village. However, remittance 
amounts are still subject to the vagaries of 
the migrant’s employment situation and 
earning potential in Greece. 
Here is a typical example of this kind of 
remittance channel. Donika (37) lives with 
her four children in the village, whilst her 
husband works away in Greece. She has no 
other income except for his remittances, 
since the children are all young and need 
looking after. For allergy reasons she 
cannot be near livestock, so that she 
cannot keep cows or sheep to supplement 
household income. Other types of 
employment in the village are lacking. 
Asked about remittances, she replied: 
Remittances vary by month and by 
season. Right now I can tell you that he 
hasn’t sent anything recently because 
he has been unemployed for three or 
four months over the winter. During the 
                                                 
12 Although see King and Vullnetari (2009a) and Vullnetari 
(forthcoming) for accounts of migrant women taking these 
dangerous routes. 
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summer he sends around €500-600, 
up to €1000 every month or two 
months. Because he also has his own 
expenses where he lives… he has to 
pay rent, buy food, this and that. We 
are like two households. So, around 
October or November we start feeling 
the pinch because there is less work 
then, and we start tightening our belts 
a bit more than during the summer. 
 From the seasonal migrant in Greece to 
his wife and children in the village. 
A significant share of the population in the 
villages are involved in this kind of 
arrangement. Seasonal migrants are partly 
those who are not able to receive long-term 
permits, but also those who do not want to 
go through the tedious and nerve-wracking 
process of applying for long-term permits in 
Greece. The majority of these migrants 
have been working in Greece since the 
early 1990s, going to-and-fro. After the 
1998 and subsequent regularisations, they 
decided to continue their back-and-forth 
regime, perhaps linked to a wish to 
continue in farming or run a small business 
in the village. However, remittances and 
earnings from Greece continue to be crucial 
in order to survive, and even to support the 
farm or business in Albania. Usually, 
seasonal migrant households are poorer 
than those of long-term migrants, since 
remittances are lower.  
Seasonal migrants nowadays move on 
short-term visas which they get at the Greek 
consulate in Korçë, sponsored by a Greek 
employer, usually a farmer, who wants 
workers often during harvest time. The 
permit is hence tied to the employer. The 
initial permit is single-entry and valid only 
for one month, but once in Greece, the 
migrant is required to register for a 
residence permit of six months, which also 
allows multiple entry into Greece during this 
period. This enables migrants to move 
around and seek work elsewhere in Greece, 
once the work they have been hired to do in 
the farm is completed. In this search for 
supplementary work migrants make use of 
networks of relatives and co-villagers who 
are residing in Greece long-term. These 
contacts, who generally live in large urban 
centres, can help them get work on 
construction sites and may accommodate 
them too. Monda (45) told of how her 
husband worked under the seasonal 
migration system:  
He works in the peach orchards, near 
Veria… Then, when that finishes, he 
goes elsewhere and does welding jobs, 
wherever he can find work 
opportunities, all sorts of work… he 
takes whatever comes… They are 
issued their visas towards the end of 
May and he leaves mid-June. He then 
returns at the end of the six months, 
sometimes in December.  
Seasonal migrants’ earnings are low and 
precarious; it is very difficult for seasonal 
workers in Greece to bring or send back 
good money. Most will earn around €18-25 
per day for 10 hours of farm work. In 
general, after expenses, they can expect to 
bring home around €1500 for a work 
season, although some manage up to 
€3000. Usually the migrant will send home 
via friends, around €150-200 per month, 
brining the rest when he returns at end-
season. Often seasonal migrant 
remittances are combined with other 
income, either direct from the migrant 
family’s own land, by casual labour on the 
farms of other families in the village; but 
such work is both scarce and very poorly 
paid. 
 From the migrant husband to his wife, 
children and parents. 
In this scenario, the remittance receiver is 
usually the migrant’s father, except when 
the latter has died or is very ill, in which 
case the recipient is the migrant’s mother, 
who may also involve his wife (her 
daughter-in-law) in the administration of 
remittances. This arrangement usually 
occurs because the migrant’s wife stays in 
Albania to take care of her husband’s 
parents, especially if he is the youngest 
son. Elda (34), who lives in the village with 
her small children and in-laws (father-in-law 
has Alzheimer’s and is bed ridden], 
describes their arrangement:  
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My husband brings the money with him 
when he comes to visit, he doesn’t 
send it. He comes in April, in August 
and for the New Year – three times a 
year… He may bring €2800 or €3000, 
sometimes more, sometimes less. 
There is no fixed amount, it depends on 
how his work goes… Myself and my 
mother-in-law, us women manage it.  
 From a migrant son to his parents, when 
the son is single. 
Usually it is the father who receives and 
administers the remittances, unless he has 
died, in which case the mother is the 
recipient. There may also be other 
unmarried brothers and sisters in the 
village household. Remittances from single 
young men can be quite substantial, since 
they do not have nuclear families to support 
in Greece.13 For their part, the rural 
household often has other income-
generating activities, such as subsistence 
farming, some orchards or livestock.  
 From the migrant son and his wife to his 
parents. 
This reflects the patrilineal structure of 
Albanian society. The sender is the son and 
the receiver the father, except where the 
latter has died, when the recipient is the 
mother.  
When the migrant son and his wife live in 
Greece together with their children, the 
sums sent to his parents are drastically 
reduced since it is recognised by all 
concerned that the migrant’s first duty of 
care is to his own nuclear family. Moreover, 
living in Greece becomes ever more costly, 
whilst the costs of the elderly couple living 
in the village remain modest, except for 
emergency expenses such as medicines 
and doctors’ bills. If the elderly couple are 
still involved in farming, remittances might 
be used to buy seeds or to facilitate 
mechanised cultivation. Remittances are 
generally brought on visits, but they may 
also be sent via other siblings or co-villagers 
living in the same town abroad. Where the 
                                                 
13 One of the major purposes is for remittances to be 
saved for the future marriage of the migrant. We shall look 
at how remittances are used later on in the paper.   
migrant couple live in Greece on their own 
and have left children in the care of 
grandparents, remittances are more regular 
and of higher amounts – typically €20-50 
per month, sent via an MTO. 
Migrant women remitters: ‘just for a coffee’ 
The above five profiles of remittance 
senders and receivers are reflective of the 
typology of male migration to Greece. Men 
remitting to their wives, parents and other 
family members are also a product of 
typical breadwinner models. Albanian – 
especially rural – society continues to be 
patriarchal, and traditional gendered 
patterns of social organisation and 
responsibility for the household are 
practiced and perpetuated through the 
migration process. However, some of these 
arrangements and traditional obligations 
are evolving into new gender roles and 
remittance patterns.  
‘Just for coffee’ is a common saying used by 
migrants to describe remittances as 
‘presents’ instead of being an obligation or 
a necessity for survival. Especially for 
female migrants and remittance senders, 
the ‘coffee’ reference often represents a 
transformative step towards a measure of 
agency in the ‘remittance game’. Albanian 
tradition requires that, once a woman is 
married, her care responsibilities are 
transferred from her own parents and 
siblings to those of her husband. In many 
cases, Albanian migrant families contribute 
to supporting only the husband’s parents so 
that, even when the wife is working and 
earning, she is not permitted to send 
money to her parents, but may be ‘forced’ 
to contribute to the remittances channelled 
to his parents (King et al. 2006). Therefore, 
‘coffee money’ is a way some women are 
allowed to circumvent the rigid channelling 
of remittances up the male line, since the 
term avoids the reference to regular 
remittances and the level of support meant 
for maintaining a household. Our research 
indicates both that old habits die hard (in 
the sense that male dominance over 
remittance chains remains quite 
entrenched) and also that ideas are 
changing – as we shall see below.  
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Some married daughters send in-kind 
remittances rather than the customarily 
more problematic monetary remittances to 
their parents. Items such as medicines, TV 
sets, refrigerators etc. were mentioned in 
our respondent data. Often this semi-secret 
channel involved daughter-to-mother 
‘presents’ (Smith 2009), but we also came 
across remittances/presents sent from a 
married sister in Greece to another married 
sister living in the village. The main female-
initiated remittance types are twofold.  
 From migrant daughter and her husband 
to her parents. 
During visits to the village, migrant 
daughters will often bring small sums of 
money to give to their parents ‘just for a 
coffee’ or as a ‘present’. As daughters are 
not expected to financially maintain their 
parents (this is the job of sons, especially 
the youngest son), anything taken or sent 
by a daughter is considered as temporary or 
one-off presents. Actually the questionnaire 
survey did not uncover these kinds of ‘gifts’, 
partly because of the way the questions 
were constructed, whereby information was 
sought on the primary remitter and less so 
on other remitters. However, the in-depth 
interviews were more revealing of these 
semi-hidden transfers and of the gender-
adjustment dynamics that were taking 
place. Several examples follow.  
First, Irena (37), married and living in 
Thessaloniki, describes how she sends 
money to her parents, and also, now that 
she is working, other ‘gifts’ such as clothes 
and foodstuffs:  
I didn’t send them money like a 
pension (i.e. regularly), but when 
someone would go there, I would send 
€100 or €200 as a dhoro (Greek: 
‘present’)… as and when we found 
relatives who travelled. If they travelled 
frequently, we sent them less; if some 
time had passed, we’d send them 
more. I would say: ‘it’s been a while 
since we sent them anything, so let’s 
send €200’. Then, when I also started 
working, besides money we would buy 
clothes for them, we took them food 
whenever we visited…  
Next, Alket (42) describes the balanced 
pattern of visits to both his parents and his 
wife’s, drawing a contrast between the 
patriarchy of the past with the more 
egalitarian situation of today: 
As for my wife’s family, when we go 
there to visit, my wife gives a present 
[again using the Greek word dhoro] to 
my in-laws. Of course, it goes without 
saying: how can you not when you are 
together husband and wife in the 
family? Should we take something to 
my father and not to her father? I am 
talking now about decent families [e 
rregullt]. If you are a man with a 
moustache [burrë me mustaqe – 
meaning a patriarchal man, a reference 
to the communist-era movies when old 
patriarchs were portrayed with bushy 
moustaches], an Albanian man like 
that, then I don’t know. But today 
women play a big role in the family… 
they even have more rights than men. 
A close reading of the above extract does 
reveal a residual subtext of patriarchy – 
note how Alket refers to his wife’s parents 
as his in-laws (not her parents), or how the 
‘gift’ is given to the two fathers and not to 
the mothers.  
Our third example is Berti (47) who has 
been living with his wife and sons in 
Thessaloniki for more than a decade. Here 
he talks about sending remittances both to 
his mother and his mother-in-law: 
Like I send money to my [widowed] 
mother, my wife also sends money to 
her mother… There is no difference, 
because she works and I work. There is 
no reason why one should send only to 
the parents of the husband… We send 
the money as a kind of pension, every 
two or three months, whenever we can 
find [trusted] people who travel there 
we send the money with them. We send 
them each around €1000, so they can 
have enough to live on.  
Further exploration of Berti’s case, however, 
reveals that it is not pure egalitarianism at 
work here. Berti’s wife comes from a 
daughters-only family, so there are no 
(migrant) sons to help them financially. 
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Hence the care responsibility has shifted to 
the only son-in-law (the other sister is 
younger and unmarried). Berti’s mother, on 
the other hand, is better off in this regard: 
she has three sons (two in Thessaloniki, 
one in the village) and a daughter in the 
United States. 
 From migrant daughters, who are single, 
to their parents. 
Independent female migration is still fairly 
rare in rural Albania: where it occurs it is 
usually when daughters go abroad to study 
at university or to pursue professional 
careers (Orgocka 2005). The situation is 
different in urban areas which provide not 
only more opportunities for such 
independent migration, including for work, 
but also the anonymity required to ‘escape’ 
the obtrusive gaze of conservative society. 
In our village-based survey, only two female 
remitters were identified, both single young 
women in their mid-20s. One works as a 
sales assistant in a supermarket in Greece; 
she remits an average of €200 per month 
to her parents in Albania, either via paid 
courier or when she visits herself. The 
recipient is the mother, indicating the 
existence of parallel daughter-mother 
remittance chains to the norm of son-father 
(cf. Smith 2009). 
The other female remitter lives in Greece in 
a three-sibling household with her younger 
sister (22) and brother (18). She was the 
first to migrate, and her siblings joined her 
later, whilst her parents and grandmother 
live in the village. She has a nursing degree 
from Albania but this is not recognised in 
Greece, so she works in a factory, as does 
her sister, whilst her brother is employed in 
construction. Between the three of them 
they remit €2000 per year and bring the 
money with them on visits. The money is 
given to the father. 
What are Remittances used for? 
A straightforward yet detailed answer to this 
question is given by Table 5 where the 
frequencies of questionnaire respondents 
citing various categories of expenditure and 
investment are set out, with multiple 
responses allowed. The table speaks for 
itself so the only commentary we provide is 
to make three general observations. First, 
the types and ranking of expenditures very 
much replicate the results of other 
remittance surveys carried out in Albania 
(de Zwager et al. 2005; King et al. 2003; 
2006; Kule et al. 2002; Uruçi and Gedeshi 
2003): in other words, an overriding 
emphasis on everyday living costs, 
improvement of the living environment 
(housing, furniture, electrical goods etc.), 
with lesser (but not insignificant) 
frequencies in farming and other business 
investments. The second observation 
relates to the high frequency (82 percent, 
second in the ranking) on the maintenance 
of life-stage traditions such as weddings, 
births, funerals etc. This share is higher 
than indicated in previous studies. Probably 
this reflects the enduring solidarity of social 
relations and cultural traditions in the 
village setting of southern Albania; and also 
the fact that migrants and their families, 
nearly two decades after the end of 
communism, have succeeded in moving to 
the ‘post-poverty’ stage. In other words, 
migration is no longer a means of pure 
survival and an escape-route from poverty, 
but enables these important family 
occasions to be financed to a higher level 
than they ever were before. The third 
remark is about the apparent low ranking 
(penultimate) of the purchase of land 
(generally in Korçë or Tirana) for the 
construction of dwellings or investment. Our 
survey does not capture the sums remitted 
or transferred for these purposes and which 
the migrants administer themselves. Our in-
depth interview data reveal that these often 
substantial sums are generally sent 
formally by the migrant from his bank 
account in Greece to his bank account in 
Albania. Hence they are not picked up by 
our remittance-recipient survey.  
Investment  
Patterns of investment of remittances (as 
opposed to just ‘spending’) have important 
implications for the development of the 
survey area in south-east Albania, and we 
can reasonably assume that these 
remittances-development linkages operate 
throughout rural Albania, since all areas
  
 
Table 5. Principal uses of remittances: percentages of respondents citing each category 
 
Category of use in rank order % 
1. Current household  expenditures (food, clothing, utilities etc.) 95.0 
2. Life-stage events (weddings, funerals, religious celebrations etc.) 82.0 
3. House improvement (new dwelling, repair of existing one) 55.4 
4. Purchase of household goods (furniture, electrical appliances, small 
generators to substitute failing electrical supply) 
55.4 
5. Medical expenses (medicines, doctors’ fees) 54.3 
6. Investment in farming  33.7 
7. Contributions to social security to ensure pension rights 30.9 
8. Savings for household needs, such as health emergencies  23.7 
9. Education of young family members 22.9 
10. Paying back debts unrelated to migration (informal borrowing from friends, 
credit from shops, loans from banks to finance business investments such 
as farm improvements) 
15.1 
11. Paying back migration-related debts (visas, smugglers etc.) 12.3 
12. Leisure and holidays  6.9 
13. Purchase of urban land for construction or investment 3.1 
14. Investment in non-agricultural business 2.6 
Source: Authors’ survey (n=350) 
 
have been affected by emigration, although 
not to a uniform extent. Most investments 
(by more than half of survey respondents, 
Table 5) are made in the construction, 
repair and general improvement of housing 
in the village, where the extended family 
lives. 
Some of this investment is also channelled 
to urban areas, as noted above. These 
homes represent both capital and social 
investment. On the one hand, they offer a 
source of income through rent,  
appreciation and possible sale. On the 
other, they may become retirement homes 
for the migrants, or homes for their 
children, upon return to Albania. Even if the 
migrants do not return, the houses remain 
as powerful and highly visible symbols of 
connectivity to the village, and a base for 
frequent return visits (Dalakoglou 2009). 
They also serve as a safety-net against 
unforeseen circumstances in the future.  
Other remittances are invested in business. 
Our fieldwork and interviews with key 
informants and returnees in the villages 
confirm that virtually all of the businesses 
in the area have been set up using 
remittances from abroad, mainly Greece. 
Much of this investment is in agriculture, 
reflecting the productive potential of the 
soil and climate in the area. Some of the 
most common and significant farm 
investments have been made in developing 
apple orchards, onion and potato 
production, and livestock farms (sheep, 
pigs, cattle). Usually it is only family 
members who work in these small 
agricultural enterprises, but some, with 
larger areas of land, hire temporary workers 
(day labourers, often Roma and Evgjit 
women) at certain times of the year such as 
planting and harvesting.  
Non-agricultural business investments 
included small grocery shops, bakeries, 
some bars and cafés, hairdressing salons, a 
few warehouses, a petrol station, and 
transport vehicles such as trucks and 
minivans. Thus, the overall importance of 
remittances in local development is highly 
significant in these communities – a finding 
which supports the research of Nicholson 
(2004) on the productive impact of 
remittances and return in rural Albania. It 
does need to be stressed, however, that all 
these agricultural and business 
investments of remittances are taken 
charge of by men – male remitters and 
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male relatives (fathers, brothers etc.) in the 
village. Consider, for example, the following 
account of Besmir (24), interviewed in 
Thessaloniki, about the development of 
apple farming with his father: 
When I go home I take pesticides for 
the apple trees, pumps and pipes for 
the irrigation system… My father calls 
me and tells me that we need this and 
that. I buy them from a pesticide 
company here, I tell them what I need, 
and they wrap it up in a package for me 
to take or send to Albania. I have to pay 
about €20 or €30 for the load to the 
taxi driver… We have plans to build a 
cooling storage for apples. I have 
enquired here [in Greece] so that we 
can export the apples, as I used to work 
in a supermarket chain here … We’ll 
see.  
Social remittances 
As we noted earlier, the social impact of 
migration on sending countries and 
communities has been little explored. Such 
non-financial impacts are often referred to 
as ‘social remittances’. These ‘ideas, 
behaviours, identities and social capital 
that flow from receiving to sending-country 
communities’ (Levitt 1998: 927) are key to 
understanding migrants as agents of social 
and political change, including changes in 
gender norms. Moreover, there is a 
connection between social remittances and 
the patterns of usage of monetary 
remittances; for instance, a switch might 
occur from wholly consumption-oriented 
expenditure to investment in business 
development as a more entrepreneurial 
culture develops through the migration 
experience.  
In the Albanian context, emigrants are 
connected to their origin country and act as 
transmitters of ideas, knowledge and 
practices in a number of ways. 
Transnational activities are increasing and 
there is an emergent transnational social 
space encompassing Albania and Greece, 
and also Albania and Italy (see Chiodi and 
Devole 2005; Maroukis 2005a; 2005b). 
First, migrants follow events in Albania 
through ethnic mass media on satellite TV, 
newspapers etc. Second, they share 
knowledge and ideas with their family 
members through telephone conversations, 
videos, letters and sometimes the internet. 
Third, they visit Albania on holiday and for 
special family occasions; those living close 
to the border may visit more regularly. 
There are also emerging practices of trade 
and transport encouraged by migrants’ 
links to business partners, as suggested in 
Besmir’s account above.  
These ideas and practices that migrants 
bring with them, or transmit through various 
channels of communication, impact on 
gender and generational roles, ethnic 
identity, class and social status, as well as 
on demography (ideas about ideal family 
size), political and human-rights ideology. 
As a result of living abroad, migrants have 
developed certain expectations of what is 
acceptable and what is not, particularly 
regarding the conduct of government and 
the standard of public services. Whilst 
some ideas and practices, such as 
agricultural innovations, are welcomed in 
Albania, changes in matters such as gender 
relations, especially expectations about 
women’s behaviour, take longer to occur. In 
the next and final section of the paper we 
focus on the impact that migration and 
remittances have had on gender relations, 
both in Albania and amongst the migrants 
in Greece.  
Effects of Remittances on Gender 
Relations 
The effect of remittances on gender 
dynamics within this study presents a 
diversified picture. First, we reiterate the 
contrast between the more egalitarian 
society of southern Albania and the more 
traditional, clan-based patriarchal system of 
northern Albania, where a previous study of 
gender and remittances was based (King et 
al. 2006). Even so, expectations regarding 
gender roles within the family in rural south-
east Albania have not changed much. Men 
are expected to be the breadwinners by 
going out and earning money, either locally 
or abroad, whilst women are expected to 
look after the home, the children and the 
husband’s parents if they are old and 
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fragile. Donika (37), a remittance-receiver 
living in the village, put it this way: 
Women are oppressed compared to 
men in Albania… especially here in the 
villages. It’s more difficult in the 
villages… the old mentality has not 
changed a lot. 
Migrant women who return to the village 
are frustrated by these pervasive traditional 
norms which govern social perceptions of 
them and limit their independence and 
mobility. Irena, also 37, who lives in 
Thessaloniki, described her visit the 
previous year to the village:  
They don’t change [referring to people 
in the village]… I went to Albania last 
summer with my husband. He left for 
Greece before me and I stayed a few 
more days. During those days I would 
go to Korçë because I was keeping an 
eye on the flat we have there and I 
would go to visit my brother-in-law.  
When a neighbour saw me in the village 
street she would say: are you going to 
Korçë? Yes, I would say, I am taking 
this minivan. Are you going there 
alone? she would ask […]. Here [in 
Thessaloniki] I go about everywhere, 
wherever I want… My sister who is also 
here in Thessaloniki lives as far away 
from where I live as the distance 
between the village and Korçë. I take 
the children and go there every 
Saturday and Sunday. My husband is at 
work, I call him and tell him: your lunch 
is ready, now I am off to visit my sister. 
OK, he says, no problem. He never 
says: how will you get there on your 
own? Whereas there [in the village] the 
neighbours are ‘concerned’ if I go to 
Korçë alone… I was hurt and felt 
uncomfortable when they asked me: 
are you going there alone? In the end 
[to stop the gossip] I was obliged to be 
accompanied by someone else.  
Similar reactions to the traditionalism of the 
villages’ non-migrants, and especially the 
older generation, were voiced by Alket (47), 
whose relatively ‘progressive’ account of 
remittance giving we discussed earlier. In 
the following passage from his interview, 
Alket paraphrases the reactions of the older 
men in the village with sons in Greece:  
The father tells his son: ‘listen here my 
son, I have raised you and I know you 
well, but since you went to Greece, I 
don’t know, but you seem to take your 
wife’s side all the time, you listen to her 
more’… They [the older folk] just stare 
at us and listen to us because they 
don’t see us for a long time and miss 
us a lot… They don’t grasp what we are 
telling them, when we explain to them 
the life we have in Greece and the 
conditions we live in [he is referring 
here to the fact that both he and his 
wife work full-time and so have to share 
household and childcare tasks]… But 
they don’t understand. 
Whilst it is clear from this quote (and from 
many other interviews and field 
observations in Thessaloniki) that  gender 
relations amongst the migrant couple are 
generally more equal in Greece than they 
are in Albania, what is less clear is the 
extent to which this results from the more 
open society in urban Greece (which, in 
actual fact, is one of the least gender-equal 
societies in the EU), or whether the sharing 
of gender-role duties is mainly ‘forced’ by 
the family’s economic situation in which 
both partners work full-time in order to 
maximise income, material quality of life, 
remittances and savings. 
Shifting our gaze back to the village, the 
hypothesised emancipating effect of 
remittances on female recipients is also 
confronted with conflicting relations. In 
female-headed remittance-recipient 
households, which in fact represent the 
majority in our survey (202 out of 350 or 58 
percent), migration and remittances have 
had a mixed effect. On the one hand there 
is more prosperity and an increased 
standard of living through the money that 
their husbands remit from Greece. This 
certainly makes for easier home-making 
and a better future for the children. On the 
other hand, many of the women interviewed 
felt there were negative sides to the story, 
which did not necessarily empower them. 
First, the emotional and human cost of 
family separation is a major issue. Couples 
 28 
see each other just a few times a year, 
often just for a few days, and children grow 
up with their fathers largely absent, leaving 
their mother to cope with all their emotional 
and other needs. Second, whilst women are 
empowered to take certain decisions 
themselves, they must also bear the weight 
of responsibility for such decisions. Third, 
there are other cases where the women 
receive remittances but are denied by their 
husbands of decision-making agency as to 
their use. Fourth, few women stay at home 
and look after their children; the majority 
combine motherhood and the role of 
homemaker with agricultural work, tending 
their vegetable plots and family livestock. 
Looking more broadly, remittances may 
play a more positive role because they 
increase the possibility that young women 
will prolong their education, perhaps to 
university, and thereby increase their 
chances of being more independent and 
mobile. Such a development of human 
capital is important, although it may not 
necessarily translate into development for 
local, rural areas. We observed several 
young women who had graduated from the 
local university in Korçë and could not find 
employment. Subjected to local pressures 
on gendered behaviour, they spend their 
days largely indoors. They have few 
occasions to go out and socialise with 
friends, especially as there are no 
entertainment or leisure spaces available to 
them in the village, except for informal 
chats and coffee in each other’s homes. 
The predominant mentality that equates 
young women’s comportment with the 
family’s ‘honour’ needs to be changed if 
women are to enjoy spaces of freedom and 
emancipation. Older women – mothers, 
grandmothers, mothers-in-law – are as 
actively complicit in this suffocating 
environment as are men. 
Conclusion 
This has been a long paper, so our 
conclusion, in partial compensation, is 
brief. First, we can affirm that we have 
responded to the entreaty of Kunz (2008) 
to develop a research approach to 
gendering remittances which is articulated 
at four levels. To recap, we have: 
 developed typologies of gendered 
household formations at both sending 
and receiving ends of the remittance 
corridor, and set out detailed accounts of 
the types of ties and transfers between 
the two; 
 broadened our concept of remittances 
from the purely financial to the in-kind 
and social categories; 
 conceptualised remittances as a 
transnational economic, social and 
moral activity which is enmeshed with 
other transnational activities such as 
visiting and care; and 
 carried out multi-sited ethnographic 
research à la Marcus (1995) by 
‘following the thing’ (remittances) from 
origin to destination.14 
Second, we summarise here our responses 
to the three questions set out in the 
introduction. So, then, who sends, and who 
receives remittances, and with what 
restrictions as to their use? Remittances 
are overwhelmingly sent by males, and are 
sent either to males or to females 
depending on the structure of the migrant 
household in Greece and the receiving 
household in Albania. If the migrant is a 
married man with his wife in Albania, the 
recipient is his wife, unless the migrant’s 
father/parents are living with the wife in the 
same household. If the migrant is a single 
man, remittances go to his father. If the 
male migrant is married and has his wife 
and family in Greece, remittances will be 
lower but still directed to his father, 
assuming the latter is still alive. In other 
words, remittances pass along the male 
lineage unless, by default, the wife is the 
temporary or seasonal de facto head of the 
household due to her husband’s 
emigration, or unless the migrant’s mother 
is a widow. 
                                                 
14 In actual fact we did not set out in our research to 
deliberately follow Kunz’s agenda. Our research was 
structured this way from the start, and we only came 
across the Kunz paper after the research was complete.  
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At the same time, we uncovered mainly 
informal remittance transactions passed 
along the female line, subject to certain 
controls and permissions, usually exercised 
by the wife’s husband, as both household 
head and primary migrant. Married women 
were, in some cases, allowed to send 
‘presents’ to their own parents, breaking 
out of the patrilineage, although the 
terminology used to describe these 
transactions – ‘gifts’ or money ‘just for a 
coffee’ – clearly marks them out as 
something less regular, lower in value, and 
altogether ‘subsidiary’ to the main 
remittances which pass along the male 
lineage. 
The other key question which we have 
addressed is the effect of remittances on 
reshaping gender relations, in both 
receiving and sending contexts. In the 
sending context we found evidence of a 
partial remaking of gender-household 
dynamics, especially in the remittance field, 
where some couples acknowledged the 
need to treat their respective parents in a 
more equal way, due to the fact that both 
parties were working and generating 
income. In the receiving context, the 
evidence is more equivalent. Remittance-
receiving wives had more decision-making 
power in the absence of their husbands, 
but this came at a price – the pain of 
separation (also for the children), the 
burden of extra responsibility, and 
multiplication of economic and parental 
roles. Returnees and migrants on return 
visits remark on the slow pace of change in 
gender relations in the village compared to 
the new gender roles taken on by migrant 
households in urban Greece. Migration and 
remittances are thus seen to be highly 
gendered processes, and the site of 
sometimes difficult negotiations, both 
between sexes and across generations, as 
to how traditional norms and power 
structures should be preserved or changed.  
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